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Abstract 
Purpose – The paper argues that abductive reasoning is a typical but usually unrecognized 
process used by HRD scholars and practitioners alike.   
Design/methodology/approach-  This is a conceptual paper that explores recent criticism 
of traditional views of theory-building, based on the privileging of scientific theorising, which 
has led to a relevance gap between scholars and practitioners. The work of Charles Sanders 
Peirce and the varieties of an abductive reasoning process are considered.  
Findings – Abductive reasoning, which precedes induction and deduction, provide a 
potential connection with HRD practitioners who face difficult problems.  Two types of 
abductive are explored – existential and analogic. Both offer possibilities for theorising with 
HRD practitioners. A range of methods for allowing abduction to become more evident with 
practitioners are presented. We consider how abduction can be used in engaged and 
participative research strategies.  
Research limitations/implications- While this is a conceptual paper, it does suggest 
implications for engagement and participation in theorising with HRD practitioners  
Practical implications-Abductive reasoning adds to the repertoire of HRD scholars and 
practitioners 
Originality/value- The paper elucidates the value of abductive reasoning  and points to how 
it can  become an integral element of theory building in HRD 
Keywords:  HRD theory, theorizing, abductive reasoning 
 
Paper type Conceptual paper 
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Theorising And Practitioners In HRD: The Role Of Abductive Reasoning. 
 
Introduction 
The place of theory and theorising remains a core feature of debates in HRD as it 
does with most other applied disciplines. Within the field, as Lynham (2002) suggests, there 
are a variety of false assumptions which treat a) theory as being disconnected from practice; 
b) theory-building and theory-builders as being isolated from the real world; and that c) view 
the use or application of theory as only an option. However, consider perhaps a typical 
process faced by an HRD practitioner, facilitating a meeting of managers and staff who are 
trying to develop a direction for their sustainability policy. After describing the complex array 
of meanings, arguments and activities which are occurring in the business, the participants 
arrive, after some consideration, at new possibilities for action. Or consider a problem-
solving workshop in which brainstorming is used as a technique to generate new insights for 
moving forward. Or consider HRD practitioner-scholars undertaking case study research for 
Master’s level dissertations and Doctoral level theses and having completed their field work 
and data analysis are seeking innovative resolutions to the real world problems they have 
identified. Our position in this paper is that in this very process of moving from a description 
of an issue which is very real and concrete for the participants to abstract considerations of 
possible actions, opportunities for theorising occur. Indeed, we suggest that there are many 
HRD moments when such moves are made to which the term abductive reasoning can be 
applied (Van Orden 2008). The basic principle is that no single problem identification or 
problem-resolving process can emerge without an observation of some initial puzzling facts. 
The reasoning process, be it from “observations to explanations” or from “explanations to 
actions”, involves constructing plausible ‘hypotheses on probation’ that are defeasible i.e. 
can be substituted if more promising ones can be found. It applies equally to scientists and 
detectives (Sintonen, 2004, p.249) and managers engaged in strategic thinking (Dew, 2007, 
Carr et al, 2004).  
We will argue that this form of reasoning, first explored by the philosopher of science, 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 – 1914), is a key but unrecognised process in HRD work and 
practice. In his formulation it is also a source of ‘new ideas’ (p.171) and the "first stage" of 
scientific inquiries (p.469), the start of a journey that could subsequently lead to a 
scientifically acceptable explanation.  Crucially for HRD practitioners, this may never be the 
intended destination. Instead, by choosing one course of action over another, practitioners 
express preference for a particular ‘hypothesis on probation’; a two-fold process of 
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attempting to arrive at an explanation for what is a confusing state of affairs, by drawing 
upon experience; and then testing the viability of the explanation by practical application. 
This results in the creation of professional knowledge or, what Shotter (1993) has termed 
practical theories which may then serve as a guide for action in future practice. It may also 
provide a wonderful opportunity for HRD scholars to engage with practitioners in the co-
creation of knowledge (Antonacopoulou 2010).  
We begin by considering recent debates on the status of theory before considering 
the process of abductive reasoning within HRD as an acceptable form of theorising showing 
how it can provide a bridge for a meaningful engagement between HRD scholars and 
practitioners as the basis for theory building.   
Theories and Theorizing 
 Ask any practitioner about how they deal with the issues that confront them and it is 
unlikely that the explicit use of what is normally termed theory will be the response. Instead 
perhaps, local understandings and what is sensible might be preferred forms of reasoning 
(Toulmin 2001). While it could be argued that these categories matched what Argyris & 
Schön, (1974) refer to as personal theories-in-use, it is doubtful that the practitioners 
themselves would acknowledge the role of theories in their practice and even less, their role 
in theorising. In HRD we are familiar with attempts to link theory and practice through the 
stages of the experiential learning cycle including the theoretical component of abstract 
conceptualisation (Kolb1984) - 'the model provides an excellent framework for planning 
teaching and learning activities’ (Tennant 1997: 92)  -  but there is little evidence that 
practitioners routinely engage in this process. Yet the model holds that engaging in the 
theoretical process of abstract conceptualisation is of significance if practitioners are going to 
deepen their learning from experience and critically reflect on what they have done and why 
they have done it. For example Kolb sees the need for managers to become “practical 
scientists” (Pavlica et al, 1998, p.301) capable of observing what has happened, generating 
theory from these observations and then testing it. Managers must be able to solve ‘new’ 
problems. In other words, they cannot just apply conventional wisdom and hope that this is 
right 
In recent years, there have been ongoing concerns about the relevance of 
management and organisation research in which HRD has its place. There has been 
increasing criticism of the privileging of scientific theorising that is deemed to provide the 
necessary rigour. This apparent aping of the natural sciences is something that Bennis and 
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O’Toole (2005) refer to as ‘physics envy’ (p.98), using a term first coined by Philip Mirowski 
(1991). Pfeffer (2005) points to the power of economics in this regard with the discipline’s 
concern for models, mathematical proofs, market solutions and claims of value-freedom. 
Both in the US and UK and beyond, it has become important for business schools to provide 
testable models through the development of particular ‘traditions and ways’ (Crainer & 
Dearlove, 1999, p.40). Lynham’s (2002) method of theory-building follows this path.  She 
argues that ‘there is an inherently generic nature to theory building” (p. 221) and that “theory 
building research methods are [merely] of a duo deductive-inductive nature” (p.237). The 
process of translating theory into practice is seen as a systematic movement from deductive 
to inductive, and that of relating practice to theory as a similar movement from inductive to 
deductive. Lynham clearly distinguishes between pure and applied theory, and believes that 
applied disciplines such as HRD are not exempt from the need to demonstrate the dual 
conditions of rigour and relevance in the theory building process to reduce the occurrence of 
atheoretical practice and non-scientific inquiry. However, perhaps as a consequence, HRD 
scholars in their pursuit of status within academe, just like their more mainstream colleagues, 
can fail to bridge the ‘relevance gap’ (Starkey and Madan 2001) 
Lynham’s (2002) position could be construed as an instance of what Donald Schön 
(1991) terms “technical rationality”, classified as the “dominant epistemology of practice” in 
which “professional activity consists in instrumental problem solving made rigorous by the 
application of scientific theory and technique” (p. 21).  Schön is concerned that this is 
inappropriate for many practical situations where theorising is centred round thought 
processes during and after problem-solving activities. His position is that in practical 
situations, of which many may include novelty and uncertainty, effective practitioners do not 
draw upon grand theories or theories of the middle range (Merton 1968). Nor do they engage 
in a rigorous scientific process of analysis. They rely upon experience and nous that can be 
enhanced over time through reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action, out of which new 
ideas can emerge. Such reasoning therefore has the potential for creative possibilities and, 
as we explore below, provides a bridging point for theorising. 
Aram and Salipante (2003) argue for a ‘bridging scholarship’ which seeks to ‘meld 
rigour and relevance’ (p.210). This has to begin and continue with the problems of those 
facing challenges. Despite the growing concern with ‘science’, practitioners in HRD still need 
to find some degree of certainty that answers can be found to the confusions and problems 
they face, if only to avoid ‘Cartesian Anxiety’ (Bernstein 1983 p.16). In seeking possible 
solutions, practitioners enter a reasoning process that helps them arrive at an action to take. 
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However, this is not to say that there is always one ‘best’ solution or action; this process may 
generate a number of possible solutions. The process provides for the possibility of being 
reasonable in a method of theorising referred to as abductive reasoning, a ‘logical operation 
which introduces any new idea’ (Peirce 1903).  
Such theorising entails the ability to act interesting questions. It is the prelude to 
theory building. Sintonen (2004) emphasises the significance of why questions as key to the 
interrogative mode of inquiry that detectives as well as scientists engage in to enable 
discovery learning. Why questions can be seen as a generic term for associated forms of 
inquiry such as: ‘How is it possible that this happened? Where did this object come from? 
What caused this to happen? Asking interesting questions leads to what if conjectures of the 
type that, as we shall see in the next section, Peirce focuses upon as a mode of explanation. 
Within this category come guesses. As Weick (1989) points out, each what if explanation is a 
conjecture or thought trial. Not all conjectures are relevant or appropriate.  The more one 
uses what he terms disciplined imagination and draws upon diverse sources of data the 
more likely one is to develop an interesting theory. Criteria that for Weick constitute an 
interesting theory include being plausible in novel ways and a source of unexpected 
connections.  
One set of outcomes of what if conjectures are those that generate new scientific 
explanations about the laws that govern the physical and natural world. Another set are 
those that suggest relationships between variables such as teaching style and learning 
transfer. Conjectures that lead to change, and actions that impact on many people, are of a 
different kind. Here we move into the arena of practical wisdom or phronesis, which 
generates different types of question concerning the implications of taking action. An 
example is the four rational-value questions developed by Flyvbjerg (2001): Where are we 
going? Is this development desirable? Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms 
of power? What, if anything, should we do about it?  
 
Abductive Reasoning 
Charles Sanders Peirce is often considered to be the founding father of pragmatism, 
a term that he coined, but spent much of his working line investigating the adequacy of 
induction and deduction, the traditional models of reasoning and inference (Fischer 2001). 
He concluded that neither induction nor deduction were enough to explain how people 
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reason; there was a need to add abduction (sometimes called by him ‘retroduction’) 
According to Peirce (1903): 
“Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something actually is 
operative; Abduction … suggests that something may be.”   
Abductive inference was seen as a ‘preparatory’ and a ‘first step’ in scientific 
reasoning which is prior to both induction and deduction... It is a response to an observation 
of facts which are initially surprising but which require explanation.  
 
“The first starting of a hypothesis and the entertaining of it, whether as a simple 
interrogation or with any degree of confidence, is an inferential step which I propose to 
call abduction. […] This will include a preference for any one hypothesis over others 
which would equally explain the facts, so long as this preference is not based upon any 
previous knowledge bearing upon the truth of the hypotheses, nor on any testing of any 
of the hypotheses, after having admitted them on probation.” (Peirce 1955:150–151) 
 The reasoning process as described by Peirce is as follows:  
The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189) 
 A stands for a hypothetical rule invented to explain a phenomenon, but in the words 
of Peirce, it is a ‘hypothesis on probation’; that is, it is not yet a truth but a tentative 
presentation of a possible truth, a new idea that carries the suspicion that it might work as an 
explanation, a what if possibility. To take it beyond what Walton (2008) terms a “plausible 
belief” (p.161) that the idea we have come up with could conceivably resolve a problem (i.e. 
be causally efficacious), there needs to be some attempt to test it. Although not worded as 
such by Peirce, for practical application the reasoning process becomes: 
The surprising problem C is observed.  
But if A worked/was implemented C would be resolved.  
Hence there is reason to suppose that A will work. 
The reasoning process is equally applicable to different levels of complexity. It would 
apply to a mechanic trying to diagnose why a car has broken down in order to repair it – 
short-term problem solving. It could equally apply to a messy organizational problem such as 
8 
 
 
 
how to implement a process for increasing understanding of and commitment to a new 
sustainability policy which not everyone accepts. 
 The reasoning involved can also be seen as form of an argument, although as 
Peirce recognised, at this stage rather a weak argument but providing for the possibility of 
further discovery through inductive testing. To demonstrate this, Pierce (1902) provides an 
example of noticing the dress and behaviour of a man on street car: 
‘I remark a man opposite to me whose appearance and behaviour unite characters 
which I am surprised to find together in the same person. I ask myself, how can this be? 
Suppose I find this problematic reply: Perhaps he is an ex-priest. He is the very image of 
such a person; he presents an icon of an ex-priest. Here is an iconic argument, or 
abduction of it.’ 
 Following Toulmin (1958), we can see how such observations are a common feature 
of everyday lives with the first step being the expression of a view based on facts which 
support the view.  In Toulmin’s terms, the argument can be expressed as: 
Claim ‘he is an ex-priest’ 
Data: appearance and behaviour unite characters which I am surprised to find 
together in the same person 
 The argument remains tentative as expressed by the use of the qualifier, ‘Perhaps’. 
Nevertheless the claim which can be seen as the hypothesis on probation is sufficiently 
plausible to suggest further action. Peirce proceeds as follows: 
‘Secondly, it now occurs to me that if he is an ex-priest, he should be tonsured; and in 
order to test this, I say something to him calculated to make him take off his hat. He 
does so, and I find that he is indeed tonsured. Here at last is an indication that my theory 
is correct. I can now say that he is presumably an ex-priest, although it would be 
inaccurate to say that there is any definite probability that he is so, since I do not know 
how often I might find a man tonsured who was not an ex-priest, though evidently far 
oftener than he would be one.’  
 With the additional data there is now growing confidence in the hypothesis, and the 
argument becomes stronger although still with the qualification of ‘presumably’. Further 
testing might be required to make the argument more valid. Toulmin showed how such 
arguments are underpinned by a warrant which provides justification for linking data to a 
claim. A warrant explains why the particular data given is relevant to the claim made (van 
Eemeren et al, 1996). For example,  
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Claim ‘he is an ex-priest’ 
Data: ‘he is… tonsured.’ 
Warrant: Ex-Priests are tonsured 
 As Gold et al (2002) have shown, consideration of the warrant can enable a critical 
understanding of assumptions and how the argument is linked to context, allowing new lines 
of enquiry to be considered  
 We could see from this process how practitioners are able to find a new way forward 
in the face of a difficult problem. The hypothesis may be tentative, ‘on probation’, but as an 
abstract idea, it is a theory - albeit a minimal one (Fischer 2001) that can be further 
developed into an explanation through a simultaneous articulation of understanding. The 
process has been critiqued by others as a logical fallacy because it seeks to provide an 
explanation, of which there could be many, from an observation or perception of surprising 
facts; this infers causes from effects. For Peirce (1935) however fallibility does not prevent 
the possibility of new ideas which ‘come to us like a flash’ as an ‘act of insight’ with ‘no force 
in the reasoning’. This would also encompass those parts of conscious understanding which 
are already known but not yet brought together to become a discovery. Abduction is 
presented as both an insight and an act of inference, even if guesswork might appear to the 
main force at work (Fann 1970). There is some debate however, as we consider below, 
about possible tension between the two processes.  
 Abductive reasoning has been presented as a resolution to the classical Meno 
learning paradox or dilemma as laid out by Socrates: how can I know anything about X if I do 
not know what X is?  Nickles (1981) explains the paradox as follows:  
‘Either you know what you are searching for or you do not. If you do know, you already 
have it, whence inquiry is pointless. And if you do not know, you would not recognize it 
even if you stumbled on it accidentally; hence, again, inquiry is impossible, pointless.’ 
(p. 89) 
 HRD practitioners frequently face variations of this paradox, when for example trying to 
explain creativity and being caught in a circular loop 
‘If one tries to account for learning by means of mental actions carried out by the 
learner, then it is necessary to attribute to the learner a prior cognitive structure that is 
as advanced or complex as the one to be acquired.’ (Bereiter, 1985, p. 202) 
It is suggested that abduction provides reconciliation of the Meno problem by its 
conceptualisation of the logic of discovery (Hanson 1958) and we can often see this at work 
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in the way practitioners find a way forward. Take the example provided earlier of a mechanic 
trying to repair a troublesome problem with a car. If the initial and expected solution doesn’t 
work then there is a need come up with something new, that extends beyond the familiar 
repertoire of possibilities. The process entails also what Donald Schön terms reflection-in-
action.  
Varieties of Abductive Reasoning 
The literature provides a number of varieties of abductive reasoning, mostly 
influenced by Peirce.   While much of Peirce’s work took place over 100 years ago, there has 
been a growing interest in the concept of abduction because of its practical utility in 
explaining the creative reasoning process. An illustrative example is the 2004 special edition 
of the journal ‘Foundation of Science’ in which the issue editors emphasise the role of 
abductive logic in providing a cognitive framework for creative model-based reasoning in 
science (Magnani and Nernessian 2004). This edition of the journal followed an earlier 
conference where over 70 papers were presented on the use of exploratory reasoning for 
creative changes to theories and concepts. 
Thagard (1988), building on Peirce, identifies four types of abduction: simple, rule-
forming, existential and analogical. Simple abduction produces hypotheses in the form of 
empirical generalisations about individual objects. Rule-forming abduction produces rules or 
theoretical generalisations that have the potential to explain other rules. For the purposes of 
this paper we focus on the distinction between existential and analogical abduction. The 
former, as we explain below, is mostly associated with the use of instinct and guessing in the 
generation of a plausible hypothesis to resolve a problem. The latter is concerned with using 
‘past cases of hypothesis formation to generate hypotheses similar to existing ones’ (p.54). 
As we will suggest, both approaches to theorising offer possibilities to the HRD community.  
Existential Abduction 
Existential abduction provides a logical formulation for an act of creativity, which in the 
face of what Rittel and Weber (1973) refer to as ‘wicked problems’, can engender a learning 
process (Khisty 2000). As we argued above, it is the problems of HRD practitioners that 
need to provide the focus for engagement. ‘Wicked’ problems need to be distinguished from 
‘tame’ problems that may involve some degree of complexity, but can be analysed and 
resolved by using known techniques. Wicked problems on the other hand arise when 
something new occurs that entails change to current ways of operating; and when there are 
multiple stakeholders who each have different perspectives on the change process, and 
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even the need for change itself.  The basic requirements for wicked problems –or messes - 
are: 
 
1. There is no definite formulation  
2. There is no stopping rule, and one usually ends up by saying ‘‘that’s good enough.’’ 
3. Solutions are neither true nor false, but just good or bad; for instance, there is no 
such thing as a true or false plan, but just a good or bad plan. 
4. The solution has no immediate and no ultimate test. 
5. Every wicked problem is a one-shot operation. 
6. They do not have an exhaustive set of potential solutions. 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
8. Every wicked problem can be considered as a symptom of another problem 
In the face of intractable and difficult issues, practitioners can move towards an 
explanatory hypothesis which ‘has to be invented ex novo’ (Eco 1984) p.42) as though 
following a model of discovery; or through an ‘instinctive insight’ generate new ways of 
understanding and knowing. Fischer (2001, p.363) is adopting an existential perspective 
when he argues that abductive reasoning is the ‘constructive modus operandi of the process 
of knowing’. He contends that learning and improving our knowledge of the world takes place 
through making logically false inferences – including mistakes - that are part and parcel of 
generating ‘hypotheses on probation’. For Paavola and Hakkarainen (2005) instinct, 
inference, and distributed cognition provide three partial abductive solutions to the Meno 
paradox of how to explain discovery learning that many have felt could not be addressed 
through conceptual tools. Popper (1959) felt that such discovery learning was the realm of 
empirical psychology: “The act of conceiving or inventing a theory seems to me neither to 
call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it” (p.31). 
Interestingly, there remains a debate about the novelty or originality of abductive 
reasoning (Kapitan 1990), especially Peirce’s view on the role of guessing. This debate is 
also reflected in current understanding on the role of instinct, intuition and tacit knowing in 
creative work (Sadler-Smith 2007).  However, Peirce, while not entirely clear on the issue, 
and this is entirely understandable given continuing debates, did not see either abduction or 
discovery as random processes of guessing based on insight. If anything, he argued, we 
have a sense of finding a hypothesis which could possibly and plausibly be true. According 
to Peirce (1929), our guessing instinct is based on  how ‘we often derive from observations 
strong intimations of truth, without being able to specify what were the circumstances we had 
observed which conveyed those intimations’ (p.282). As Hanson (1958) argued, abduction is 
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closely linked to our perceptions and perhaps more importantly our pre-conceptions which 
also provides a strong connection to Gadamer’s (1989) hermeneutic philosophy and his 
basic argument that human understanding in the phenomenological present is by necessity 
grounded in pre-understanding and language. That is, without pre-understanding, it is 
impossible to understand or engage in an interpretative act (Kögler 1999). Further, such pre-
understanding or ‘prejudice’ is always historically formed, mediating meanings made in the 
present but from a historical situatedness and positioning.  
Hoffman (1997) highlights Peirce’s attention to the mediation of ‘signs’ and ‘elements 
of generality’ and this also chimes with a Vygotskyian view of action (Vygotsky 1982). For 
any person in action, there is always a goal, the achievement of which is enabled or 
constrained by the use of mediating tools, particularly the use of signs and language; as 
Vygotsky explained, such tools include ‘‘systems for counting; mnemonic techniques; 
algebraic symbol systems; works of art; writing; schemes, diagrams, maps, and technical 
drawings; all sorts of conventional signs, and so on.’ (p. 137). According to Vygotsky, such 
tools, mediate our thoughts, feelings and behaviour and are crucial to the development of 
more advanced forms of understanding. The most important tool is language but all tools are 
socially and culturally formed and therefore a crucial feature of any context. It against such  
context and through the use of signs that it becomes possible for learners to respond, 
abductively to what is surprising or unfamiliar with the possibility of a new way of going on – 
a hypothesis on  probation is discovered, not as a guess without hope but as a possibility 
that carries ‘contextual meaning’ (Shotter 2008, p.33).  
Analogic Abduction 
The process of existential abduction allows for the generation of hypotheses which 
are plausible but rudimentary in nature. Such hypotheses are not understood as true but 
carry the possibility of truth and are therefore worth considering for further examination (Haig 
2005). Analogic abduction works with the use of existing hypotheses to generate something 
similar, through the development of models based on analogical reasoning.  Peirce had 
identified the importance of analogy and analogic reasoning in order to expand knowledge 
further through the accumulation of evidence. It is the way that something ‘unknown’ 
becomes ‘known’ by ‘its analogy with other things known’. As he warned, ‘do not attempt to 
explain phenomena isolated and disconnected with common experience. It is a waste of 
energy, besides being extremely compromising’.  
This approach to theorising has found growing favour with scientists where there has 
been significant interest in analogical reasoning in such fields as Cognitive Science and 
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Artificial Intelligence, interestingly as a means to provide problem-solving heuristics through 
modelling (Abrantes 1999). There has also been interest among social science and 
humanities researchers who seek to advance theoretical development through such 
approaches such as Grounded Theory and Action Research (Richardson and Kramer 2006). 
Analogic abduction and reasoning are concerned with how we use similarity and 
association in our understanding. There is a connection here with Bruner’s (1986) distinction 
between a logico-scientific mode of thinking and a narrative mode. The former consists of 
propositional statements but the latter gives more prominence to the way we make sense of 
our lives with others.  Narrative is considered as the main contribution to the meaningfulness 
of human experience (Polkinghorne 1997). Within any narrative told, an interpretation of 
ideas, actions and events will draw on analogy, metaphor and other linguistic tropes to make 
meaning and sense of a perceived reality.  
Heeding Peirce’s warning to not ‘waste energy’, we can offer a number of ways that 
would allow analogical abduction to become more evident with practitioners. These include: 
1. Story-telling – spoken or written that allow the presentation of what has happened in 
relation to actions agreed.  Stories provide a means to represent realities capturing 
the richness of context and told in relation to a pattern and plot.  
2. Stories are replete with analogy, metaphor and arguments which are employed to set 
a direction and make a point. Closer attention to the way these are used allows the 
surfacing for new possible hypotheses, again on probation but moving more closely 
towards a better explanation of facts.  
3. The personal nature of narrative and their linguistic expression also offers the 
possibility for critique of claims made. Practitioners can find new ways to consider 
difficult issues by surfacing and testing underlying assumptions. 
4. As an aid to considering patterns of reasoning, practitioners can reconsider data 
already accumulated as a map or model.  According to Huff and Jenkins (2002), 
maps provide a visual representation allowing learners to see their thoughts, allowing 
them to make sense of what is going and providing the potential for further creativity 
and consideration of implications. Conceptual or causal models and maps indicate 
relationships between various elements which are considered relevant to the issue. 
Vertue and Haig (2008) employed causal modelling as stage in the analysis of data in 
a process of abduction reasoning in the description and explanation of health 
problems. 
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Through such processes, it also becomes possible for HRD practitioners in 
collaboration with scholars to become more aware of how abductive reasoning can lead to 
new discoveries with others in the context of the workplace. Magnani (2001) considers how a 
process of inquiry to learn about issues can become more than just ‘doing’; in what he refers 
to as manipulative abduction for behaviour that involves ‘thinking through doing’, resulting in 
the production of ‘communicable accounts’ of what is found which can then be integrated 
into existing practices (p. 53). Such behaviour is regarded as ‘extra-theoretical’ in the sense 
of the way thoughts need to be articulated and communicated with others. It is a reminder 
that complex and wicked problems are seldom resolved by individuals alone and require a 
collective response based on collaboration between different participants (Grint 2005). Khisty 
(2000) invokes Bateson’s (1979) framework of levels of learning and points to the way a 
group will attempt to solve a difficult problem by ‘backtracking’, using past experience and 
intuition. Solutions that are developed can only be tentative as possibilities but need to be 
agreed and shared among a group. The potential here is for significant and even radical 
discoveries for change in organisations and structures, corresponding with Bateson’s 
Learning Level III. 
 
Theory Building, Research Strategies And Abduction 
In recent years there have been a number of approaches to theory building within the 
social sciences that see abductive reasoning as an integral element and which go beyond 
the conventional induction – deduction dichotomy that is so familiar in research methods 
textbooks. Two of the most influential are summarised below. 
Blaikie’s Abductive Research Strategy 
Blaikie (2000) introduces four research strategies of which abduction is one. His 
interpretation of abduction is different to those formulations so far considered. For him an 
abductive research strategy, unlike deductive and inductive research strategies, focuses on 
‘the meanings and interpretations, the motives and intentions, that people use in their 
everyday lives and which direct their behaviour’ (Blaikie 2007, p.90). He refers to abductive 
layers that permit iterations between theory and practice to resolve sense-making: 
“Everyday concepts and meanings 
provide the basis for 
social action/interaction 
about which 
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social actors can give accounts 
from which 
social scientific description can be made 
from which 
social theories can be generated 
or which can be understood in terms of existing 
social theories and perspectives”  
(Blaikie 2007, p.90) (emphasis in original) 
 
He admits that his use of abduction as a research strategy incorporates some of 
Peirce’s ideas ‘but has a different emphasis because of its exclusive application within the 
Interpretive approach to social enquiry’ (Blaikie 2000, p.114). Indeed his formulation of a 
retroductive research strategy (p.111) is closer to Peirce’s approach, although he considers 
it to have limited applicability to the social sciences where – as he puts it - ‘the nature of 
explanatory mechanisms is usually well known’ (p.111). In discussing retroduction he asks 
whether there is a logic of discovery. If so: ‘it requires disciplined scientific thinking aided by 
creative imagination, intuition and guesswork’ (Blaikie 2009, p.87). This, of course, is 
existential abduction!! 
Van de Ven’s Engaged Scholarship Research Model 
Van de Ven (2007) has formulated a participative method of research ‘for expanding 
the capabilities of scholars to study complex problems and create the kind of knowledge that 
advances both science and practice’ (p.9). The resultant framework of ‘engaged scholarship’ 
is designed to support the likelihood of scholars discovering more about a complex 
phenomenon by involving others in the various activities of the research process. These four 
activities of research design; theory building; problem formulation; and problem solving can 
be undertaken in any sequence.  Of particular significance for this paper is his emphasis on 
the role of abduction in theory building.  For him theory building involves three activities: (1) 
conceiving or creating a theory; (2) constructing or elaborating the theory; and (3) justifying 
or evaluating a theory. Each activity entails a different type of reasoning: abduction is used 
for conceiving a theory, whereas logical deduction is the basis for constructing a theory, and 
inductive reasoning for evaluating a theory. Unlike Blaikie he doesn’t identify a separate 
abductive or retroductive research strategy but sees abductive reasoning as an essential 
component – alongside induction and deduction - in the theory building process.  
Summary and Concluding Thoughts 
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 This paper has looked into the implications of viewing theorising and the relationship 
between HRD theory and practice from an abductive reasoning perspective. Following an 
introduction to the classical pragmatist formulation of hypotheses on probation by Charles 
Sanders Peirce it has analysed more recent perspectives, focusing on existential and 
analogical abduction. The significance of abduction for discovery learning and the possible 
resolution of the Meno learning paradox have been reviewed. Peirce was concerned with 
truths and scientifically acceptable explanations. The paper emphasises that with practical 
applications and change situations abductive reasoning of itself takes us no further than 
creating plausible explanations/ways forward that seem to be viable but about which one 
may be mistaken. Yet that doesn’t vitiate the need for action and ultimately we have to make 
choices. As Donald Schön recognised, those choices and our hypotheses on probation are 
strengthened through our ability to learn from our experiences and develop our problem 
solving expertise in practical situations. Expertise involves learning how to formulate 
questions that can generate unexpected answers and lead to informed judgments in 
situations of uncertainty. Over the years HRD practitioners have developed a set of 
mechanisms to enable and support critical reflective practice. The notion of abductive 
reasoning adds to this repertoire. Phronesis highlights the importance of a value-oriented 
approach as we exercise those choices and engage in the reflective process. 
Our discussion suggests a need for HRD scholars and practitioners to engage with 
knowledge produced in the context of application.  This is akin to what Gibbons et al (1994) 
term ‘mode 2’ knowledge, “characterised by a constant flow back and forth between the 
fundamental and the applied, between the theoretical and the practical” (p.19).  Mode 2 
reflects conceptions of praxis and learning by problem solving rather than experts presenting 
learners with solutions. This contrasts with ‘mode 1’ knowledge which is “generated within a 
disciplinary, primarily cognitive, context” (p.1), often through formal ‘teacher centred’ as 
opposed to ‘learner centred’ development processes, such as classroom teaching. Watson 
(1996) illustrates how theory can be counter-productive in the learning process, especially 
when it is presented as an end in itself, as is the case in some management classrooms.  He 
talks about ‘lay theorising’ as a process in which learners can engage as way of making 
sense of theory or the way things are in organisations rather than relying on theoretical 
models to do this for them. An unquestioning approach to theory is likely to lead to ‘surface’ 
rather than ‘deep’ learning (Marton and Säljö, 1976). In applying this questioning approach to 
the nature of work and organisations, starting with questions such as, ‘how do you go about 
getting people at work to do things you want them to do?’ (Watson, 1996:459) and then 
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examining how models and concepts can help or hinder the search for answers, theory 
becomes an enabling rather than guiding mechanism in learning. 
As a guiding mechanism it can support notions of power and control (Sambrook 
2004) by proposing a ‘managing by numbers’ approach that reinforces organisation dogma 
with one ‘best’ solution or action. Such an approach to learning transfer is problematic for 
developing the skills and insights to resolve wicked problems and has led Lave (1996) to 
argue that informal learning is superior to traditional methods.  
Practitioners and scholars should therefore reflect on their contribution and role in 
supporting individuals to learn. They should consider rejecting a traditional primus inter pares 
role (‘sage on the stage’) through which they impart only propositional knowledge, without 
going so far as to echo the view of Rogers and Frieburg (1969) that anything that can be 
taught is rather inconsequential. In any curriculum, methods that allow learners to make their 
own discoveries such as Participatory Action Research (PAR) should be emphasised. As 
Chiu (2006) proposes that the twin goals of PAR are emancipation and transformation, 
learners can uncover knowledge that is relevant in their specific context, and develop 
practical wisdom (phronesis).   
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